Southeast Asia A Theater For Great Power Game – Analysis

Major powers of the world have started wooing the nations in the Southeast Asia. Some of the suitors want the prominent nations in the region as their pawns, while others seek their cooperation for common good. The underlining factor is their strategic positioning which the suitors want to leverage.

But there are risks and dangers which ought to be weighed in the strategic matrix in the background of which the suitors’ calculations are determined. In this larger picture, while the US remains the sole superpower and thus the main architect to maintain regional and global order, there are some disruptors who attempt to disturb the existing equilibrium. There are some other smaller but equally influential nations that remain in the periphery but equally significant actors in the context of contributing to regional peace and order. In this complicated matrix, the roles of the US, China and Japan and their recent activities come under scrutiny for regional good. 

In this context, the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia in April 14-18, 2025 and the intent thereof deserves scrutiny. The visit sparked speculation over Southeast Asia’s strategic options as countries in the region reassess their relationships with a seemingly unpredictable US under Trump. This was Xi’s first overseas trip, which was meant to showcase the Asian powerhouse’s clout in the region. When US President Donald Trump announced a 90-day pause on tariffs, his threats turned into a push to keep Southeast Asian leaders from cutting deals at Beijing’s expense. By putting a thaw, Trump sought to punish Beijing for retaliating, while entering smaller Asian economies to offer concessions to stave off drastic duty hikes. By choosing the three countries in Southeast Asia as his first overseas visit of 2025 Xi probably was aiming to form alliances to fight back against the US in the trade war. 

As Xi kicked off the first diplomatic tour of Southeast Asia with Hanoi as the first stop, Xi remarked there are no winners in a trade and tariff war and presented China as a force for stability in contrast with Trump’s latest tariffs moves. True, Trump put a pause on some tariffs but still kept in place 145 per cent duties on China, the world’s second largest economy. He exhorted the Vietnamese leadership to jointly and resolutely safeguard the multilateral trading system, stable global industrial and supply chains, and open and cooperative international environment. Xi’s objective was to showcase China to Southeast Asia as a responsible superpower in the way that contrasts with the way the US under Trump presents to the whole world. 

Xi’s visit to Vietnam was planned earlier but it was fast tracked because of the tariff fight between China and the US. The visit was seen as a path for Beijing to shore up its alliances and find solutions for the high trade barrier that the US imposed on Chinese exports. While meeting with counterpart Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary To Lam, Xi underlined the commitment of both the countries for peaceful development, and deepening of friendship and cooperation, which, he claimed, brought the world stability and certainty. 

After meeting with Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, Xi and Chinh signed a series of memorandums. Both sides agreed to speed up a $8 billion railway project connecting the two countries in a deal that was approved in February 2025.The timing of the visit sent a strong political message that Southeast Asia was important to China. Given the severity of Trump’s tariffs and despite the 90-day pause, Southeast Asian nations feared that the tariffs could complicate their development.

Though Vietnam is a communist country with one-party system like China, it also has adopted the China’s model of economic development with export-oriented growth strategy. Interestingly, despite that Vietnam has a bitter historical past with its relations with both the US and China, it has maintained a strong relationship with the US and deep economic ties with China. The simmering frictions with China over the claims over parts of the South China Sea continue, though. Now it finds itself in a trick situation in balancing relations with both.    

It may be recalled thatVietnam was the only country that received both US President Joe Biden and China’s Xi Jinping in 2023.  That year it also upgraded the US to its highest diplomatic level, the same as China and Russia.Vietnam was one of the biggest beneficiaries of countries trying to decouple their supply chains from China, as businesses moved to Vietnam. China is its biggest trading partner. Bilateral trade surged 14.6 percent year-on-year in 2024 and that trade relationship goes both ways. Since Xi became the president of China in 2013, he has only visited Vietnam twice. It thus transpired that Xi’s choice to visit the three Southeast Asian countries was to insulate China against Trump’s tariffs war.  

Here, Vietnam finds itself walking a tight rope. It finds itself sandwiched in the cross-fire of US-China trade war as it is sensitive to be allegedly seen in the US as serving as a backdoor for Chinese goods. Vietnam itself was hit with 46 per cent tariffs under Trump order before the 90-day pause. Both Vietnam and China have also real long-term differences, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea, where Vietnam has faced off with China’s coast guard but does not often publicize the confrontations.

Xi’s charm offensive in Southeast Asia may have been intended to send a message to Washington and a strategy to play by putting one against the other, thereby wedging a wall in their relationship, but the countries in Southeast Asia are not naive to fall into the trap of either Beijing or Washington. The countries in Southeast Asia are adept at avoiding conflict among themselves, and manoeuvring between big powers at the same time. This means their strategy has remained open to the US that co-exists with the geographical and economic reality of China.

Trump’s tariffs war threatens to disrupt the growth strategy of the ASEAN countries. After Trump announced the new tariffs, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on 25 April cuts its 2025 growth forecast for the ASEAN bloc to 4.1 per cent, 0.6 percentage points lower than its previous forecast for the year. 

Here the centrality and the relevance of the bloc come to test as individual countries prefer to negotiate bilaterally with the US for concessions rather than stand up collectively. Trump is aware of this vulnerability of the bloc. For example, Indonesia was the first country of the bloc to send top officials to Washington for talks. As regards China, despite Trump has unleashed a trade war with China, China is already deeply embedded in global value chains that Trump’s tariffs might not bite much too China. Beijing is cognizant of this strategy and as a counterpoint has been cultivating its Southeast Asian neighbours, not now but for years.            

While the US has only a two-year or four-year lens, the Chinese have a 20- or 30-year lens. The first country to propose a free trade agreement to ASEAN, which is a pro-American organization, was not any western state, it was China. Like previous US Presidents, Trump too realises that Southeast Asia is not an anti-American region; it is not a hotbed of anti-Americanism. The US realizes that if it doesnot cultivate ASEAN it might lose Southeast Asia. However, by his erratic and often impulsive policy decisions, Trump risks losing appeal of his country as a reliable partner by his tariffs war.  

The US and China might look at the Southeast Asian region to play their great power game but the bloc members have demonstrated the maturity to avoid becoming entangled in the designs of either power. The past experience would indicate that while maintaining the centrality of the organisation, individual member states maintain cordial relations keeping their national interests in mind. For example, the US has been reinforcing its military capabilities in the Philippines. Vietnam is adept at preserving its own agency, maintaining good relations with Russia, China and the US. It maintains robust defence and strategic ties with India and Japan. After Xi’s visit to Vietnam in April, Hanoi reached an agreement to buy F-16 fighter jets from the US. Even India has entered into an agreement to sell its supersonic BrahMos missiles to the Philippines and plans to do the same to Indonesia as well. Talks of BrahMos missiles to Vietnam have remained in the news too for a long time but pricing reportedly has remained a factor on a decision.

Xi’s message appeared clear: he sought to convey that China remains a stable and predictable partner—subtly reminding the region that China is the top trading partner for both Vietnam and Malaysia, and a significant investor in Cambodia.

In Malaysia, Xi and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim signed a slew of deals over artificial intelligence, rail connectivity and exports. Ibrahim acknowledged Chinese government’s contribution for the well-being of the people of Indonesia and for the national economic interests, as well as the overall development and stability of the country. Xi signed 113 agreements. Some were binding, many preliminary, but they demonstrated presence at a time when US engagement was absent, or even punitive. The message to Trump was loud and clear – that for ASEAN, the trip had value for, it allowed the region to signal to Washington that it has options and that China may step in where the US falls short.  

Unless Trump chooses course correction, the ASEAN as a bloc shall continue to hedge. While Beijing positions itself as a champion of free trade, the US under Trump is likely to pursue an inward-looking policy with protectionism as the preferred policy choice- one that risks being self-defeating. Such a stance would suit Beijing to further economically penetrate into the markets of the ASEAN countries and expand smoothly towards strategic alignment. However, persistent economic and security challenges could deter some Southeast Asian countries from getting too close or moving too quickly, towards Beijing. Beijing needs to choose a delicate balancing act to make its presence in the region relevant and must shed its image of being a threatening power. At the moment however, that appears to be a tough call given Beijing’s global ambition to emerge as a superpower, thereby eclipsing the US. Beijing has already invested substantially in cultivating ASEAN and this sustained engagement has contributed to the widely held perception that China is now the most influential power in the region across multiple domains. The onus lies on Beijing to sustain this reputation by continuing with the spirit of mutual cooperation and accommodation of interests.   

As a start, Beijing has to change its aggressiveness on territorial issues. It has on-going disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam over the South China Sea. China’s intensified regional diplomacy may yield strategic dividends but it will continue to be tempered by both external resistance and internal constraints. Conversely, it is to ASEAN’s advantage that its members’ proximity to China puts Southeast Asia high on Washington’s radar. Thus it transpires that Southeast Asia as a region shall continue to remain as an important playground for great power game. It remains to be seen how individual member states of the bloc play their roles singularly and collectively on issues that impact regional peace and stability. 

About the authors:

• Dr. Rajaram Panda is former Senior Fellow at PMML, Ministry of Culture, New Delhi. Earlier, he was Senior Fellow at MP-IDSA, Minister of Defence, Lok Sabha Research Fellow, and ICCR Chair Professor at Reitaku University, Japan.    
• Ms. Upasha Kumari, Member of CAD, Delhi Public School Ghaziabad Society, advances academic excellence and curricular governance across DPSG schools. A former Education and Public Policy Consultant and Political Science educator, she specializes in Education, Political Science, and Peace & Conflict Studies.