Russia’s Governors Increasingly Taking Positions On Key Issues At Odds With Moscow – Analysis
By Paul Goble
Since coming to power 25 years ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin has worked hard to create a common legal system across all of Russia. He has been remarkably successful, making emerging regional differences even more striking.
Ever more federal subjects, despite having Kremlin-appointed leaders and being tightly controlled by Moscow via their budgets, are taking positions at odds with Moscow’s. These regional governments are more extreme than Moscow on three key issues—access to abortion, the sale of alcohol, and the treatment of migrants. Regional differences driven by divergence from Moscow’s policies have sparked abortion and alcohol “tourism,” as well as the movement of migrants (see EDM, March 13).
Given the extent of Putin’s power, he could end this policy variance relatively quickly. His inaction, however, suggests that he has decided that doing so would cause more problems than they are worth or that policy diversity is a useful way to test new policies, mollify the population, or deflect foreign criticism.
The allowance of limited political heterogeneity could accustom regional governments to a degree of autonomy. Local leaders may then decide that they should have the power to make choices on other issues, triggering a return to the tensions during the 1990s between Russian regions and Moscow. Some observers suggest, however, that governors who have gone the furthest in enacting radical policies may be “the new normal” if only because taking extreme positions garners Kremlin attention and possible political advancement. The implementation of these policies at the regional level rather than from Moscow provides the Kremlin with deniability over how much it is involved (Window on Eurasia, March 27; The Moscow Times, May 19; Sever Info, May 21).
Approximately 20 percent of Russia’s federal subjects have adopted policies that deviate from the Kremlin’s over the last year. Governors acting on a perceived mandate from Moscow to come up with their own policies regarding abortion, alcohol sales, and migrants have adopted policies to the right of Moscow’s preferences, in many cases directly violating existing Russian law. Some regional leaders have made it almost impossible for women to get abortions near their homes, meaning women travel to neighboring areas where federal standards are still in place and abortions remain available (Novaya Gazeta, February 7; see EDM, March 13).
Given Putin’s fears about population decline, the Kremlin leader has not moved against regional abortion restrictions, a possible indication that they are not a violation of Putin’s will, but rather a bellwether of where Moscow is heading (Telegram/@RakshaDemography, May 16; The Moscow Times, May 17). Despite a decline in the number of abortions in Russia in recent years, federal restrictions on abortion would likely anger large swaths of Russian women who, despite the declines in the number of abortions in that country in recent years, continue to rely on that procedure (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, May 15).
The Duma opened the door for regional differences in laws regarding alcohol sales earlier this year by passing a law allowing federal subjects to restrict the sale of alcohol. Sixteen of the federal subjects passed new laws, often adopting policies more extreme than Moscow appears to have intended. Some federal subjects were very close to banning the sale of alcohol altogether (Telegram/@dlenobl, May 10; Telegram/@aluminievie;Telegram/@truehabarovsk, May 12; Telegram/@News_Vologda, May 14; Nezavisimaya, May 15).
Restrictions on the sale of alcohol, however, may have been a public relations ploy designed to suggest that officials were trying to reduce alcohol consumption. In reality, few officials would truly want to significantly reduce alcohol sales, given how much tax money they take in from the sale of alcohol. Restrictions caused some to turn to samogon (самогон), the Russian word for moonshine, and even more dangerous surrogates (Versia, April 14).
Regional approaches to migrant workers may create the most serious problem for Moscow. While most migrant workers from Central Asia and the Caucasus are concentrated in major cities such as Moscow, more of them are seeking jobs in regions far beyond Moscow’s Ring Road (Gazeta.ru, May 19; Sib Media, May 20). The presence of migrant workers increasingly angers regional populations, and local officials are taking such extensive actions that some migrants are appealing to Russian courts (see EDM, May 15, 2024; Kavkaz Realii, October 27, 2024; RG.ru; OSN Media, May 20).
Moscow officials often support hostility toward immigrants, even though the Kremlin continues to say that Russia needs their labor. If discontent toward migrants continues to grow in the regions, which is likely if officials continue to behave in an even more hostile than those at the center, then there is the danger that hostility toward immigrants will transfer onto indigenous non-Russians, especially as there are so few actual migrants in most parts of the Russian Federation outside big cities (see EDM, October 15, 22, 2024).
The divergence of regional leaders is especially significant because Putin appointed them and controls their budgets. The willingness of governors to exceed what the Kremlin has approved is a striking suggestion of the Kremlin’s weakness and belies that regional leaders increasingly believe that they must respond to their constituents even if that puts them at odds with Putin and his regime.
The number of governors involved and the degree of divergence from Putin’s positions, however, are not significant enough to pose an immediate threat. Putin could crush them, but if divergences continue and more local leaders follow suit, especially if figures in Moscow continue their support, Putin will face a Hobson’s choice (Gazeta.ru, May 19). He will either have to bring his position into closer alignment with regional leaders, something that would fundamentally change the nature of his system, or he will face a threat from his own appointees in the federal subjects.
- This article was published at The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 22 Issue
